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Case No. 20170904–CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
After the IRS said Scott Alan Rasmussen owed more taxes than he
expected three years in a row, Rasmussen decided to study the tax code to
determine for himself how much he should be paying in taxes. After months
of studying IRS publications and other materials, Rasmussen decided that he
did not have to pay any taxes. He decided that his employment wages were
not income, that only businesses were required to pay income tax, and that
he therefore had no duty to file income tax returns or pay taxes.
The Utah State Tax Commission disagreed. Through twenty-three
various notices, it informed Rasmussen that he was required to file a tax

return and pay state income taxes. But Rasmussen dug in and insisted that he
was not required to pay taxes or file a tax return.
At his trial for tax evasion and failure to file tax returns over a six-year
period, Rasmussen requested an instruction stating that a good-faith
misunderstanding of the law was a complete defense even if that
misunderstanding was unreasonable. The trial court denied the instruction
because it believed the instruction went “too far”—a change in the relevant
statute specified that two of the six charges Rasmussen faced for failure to file
a tax return required a showing that Rasmussen act without a reasonable,
good-faith basis. But the court invited Rasmussen to submit a revised
instruction that would distinguish among counts. Rasmussen never did.
On appeal, Rasmussen repeats his argument that he was entitled to an
instruction stating that any good-faith mistake of law need not be reasonable.
But Rasmussen has not addressed, let alone challenged, the actual basis of the
trial court’s ruling. This Court should thus decline to address Rasmussen’s
claim on appeal.
It is unnecessary to reach the question of whether Rasmussen was
entitled to the instruction he requested for a second reason: Any error in
denying the instruction was harmless. First, the requested instruction would
not have affected two of Rasmussen’s convictions, which by statute required
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Rasmussen’ good-faith belief to be reasonable. Second, even if the jury had
been instructed as requested, there is no reasonable likelihood that it would
have found that Rasmussen actually believed in good faith that he was not
required to pay taxes. The Tax Commission repeatedly notified him that his
interpretation was wrong and that he did have to pay taxes.
Alternatively, the jury was adequately instructed. Even if Rasmussen
were correct that in Utah an unreasonable but good-faith misunderstanding
of the law could negate the required mental state for tax evasion and failure
to file taxes, Rasmussen was not entitled to a separate instruction on the issue.
The law in Utah is clear that a separate good-faith instruction is superfluous
when the jury has been instructed on the required mental state.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it omitted a jury
instruction that said a good-faith misunderstanding of the law need not be
reasonable?
Standard of Review. Whether a trial court correctly denied a requested
jury instruction is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Maestas,
2012 UT 46, ¶148, 299 P.3d 892. However, courts “look at the jury instructions
‘in their entirety and will affirm when the instructions taken as a whole fairly
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.’”
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of Relevant Facts
Scott Alan Rasmussen did not file a Utah tax return for tax years 2010
through 2015, despite making an average of $46,000 each of those years.
R444–45, 606–07. Rasmussen declared himself exempt from tax withholding
and did not file tax returns because he decided that individuals are not
required to pay income taxes—only businesses are. R583–84, 590, 592–94.
Rasmussen maintained this stance despite the twenty-three notices he
received from the Utah State Tax Commission informing him that he had to
pay taxes. R473.
Rasmussen takes issue with the income tax.
Rasmussen lived and worked in Washington as a manufacturing
engineer, paying federal income taxes without issue for more than a decade.
R577, 579. (Washington does not have a state income tax. R605.) But then the
IRS informed Rasmussen three years in a row that he owed additional taxes.
R581. The first year, Rasmussen “got mad and paid it.” R581. But when he
continued to get notices that he owed more in taxes, Rasmussen “studied”
his tax liability. R582. For “at least two months,” Rasmussen went to the
library and “dug into” IRS materials and tax manuals. R582, 585. Rasmussen
concluded that only businesses are required to pay taxes, and because he was
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a common-law employee he should be exempt because his wages were not
income. R586; SE14; SE16. According to Rasmussen, the only way an
individual is required to file and pay taxes is if the individual files a tax
return—the act of filing a tax return makes the individual a business. R583.
Based on his interpretation of tax law, Rasmussen changed his federal
withholding status to exempt on his W-4 forms and stopped paying federal
taxes. R446, 586–88, 603; DE1. Rasmussen moved to Utah but did not start
filing state tax returns. R446, 580, 603–05. 1
The Tax Commission repeatedly informs Rasmussen of his tax liabilities.
When the Tax Commission receives wage information from an
employer or receives other information indicating that a person may be
required to file a tax return, but that person does not file a return, the Tax
Commission sends the person a Request for Filing Information. R427–28. If
the person does not adequately respond, the Tax Commission sends a Notice
of Deficiency and Estimated Income Tax. R427–28. If the person does not pay
the estimated amount or appeal the decision, the Tax Commission sends a
Notice of Taxes Due and Intent to Lien. R429. If the person does not pay at

Rasmussen’s employers generally did not withhold Utah income tax
from his paychecks. SE1; SE3. Some was withheld between 2010 and 2013,
but it was insufficient to cover Rasmussen’s full tax liability. SE2; SE21.
1
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least a minimum amount toward the balance due, the Tax Commission
records a tax lien against the person and sends a Notice of Lien and Intent to
Offset, informing the person that a lien had been recorded and of the methods
the Tax Commission intended to use to collect the tax. R429.
In April 2013, the Tax Commission sent Rasmussen two separate
Requests for Filing Information for the 2010 and 2011 tax years. R453; SE4;
SE8. Rasmussen responded that he did not owe taxes because he was an
“employee working for wages, not income.” SE14. The Tax Commission
apparently rejected this explanation, sending Rasmussen two separate
Notices of Deficiency and Estimated Income Tax in May 2013 and requesting
him to pay $2,904.55 for 2010 and $3,384.54 for 2011. SE5; SE9.
Rasmussen appealed those assessments. R450–51; SE15; SE16; SE17. As
part of the appeals process, he submitted a memorandum presenting his
interpretation of the tax code and he participated in an administrative
hearing. R475; SE16. In his memorandum, Rasmussen stated that the IRS
never contacted him to challenge his claim that he was exempt from
withholding. SE16. Rasmussen also claimed that he believed in good faith
that his employment wages were not income, and to support his position he
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quoted from what he said were several United States Supreme Court cases,
though many were from lower courts. SE16. 2
In August 2015, the Tax Commission rejected Rasmussen’s appeal and
upheld the assessment. R573, 599–600; SE17.
In November 2015, the Tax Commission sent Rasmussen two separate
Notices of Taxes Due and Intent to Lien for the 2010 and 2011 tax years,
directing Rasmussen to pay his tax deficiencies within one month. SE6; SE10.
When Rasmussen did not pay, the Tax Commission sent him two separate
Notices of Lien and Intent to Offset in January 2016. SE7; SE11. Rasmussen
still did not pay. R446–47. The Tax Commission sent Rasmussen additional

Though it is not clear on the face of Rasmussen’s memorandum, most
of the cases he quoted—including several federal district court cases labeled
as Supreme Court cases—addressed such questions as whether stock
dividends are income, not whether wage compensation is income. SE16. The
one case that is on points is Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). But Rasmussen
quotes the party’s argument in that case as if it were the Court’s holding.
Compare SE16, with Lucas, 281 U.S. at 112–13. The Court rejected that
argument. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114. And it has more recently reiterated that the
argument is “frivolous” and has been “repeatedly rejected by the courts.”
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 195 (1991).
2

(When Lucas was decided, the Supreme Court Reporter often included
excerpts from the parties’ arguments in the official report of the case,
immediately preceding the opinion of the Court. While that language has
been removed from Westlaw’s online publication of the report, it is available
in hard copy, or online through the Library of Congress at
http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep281/usrep281111/usrep281111.
pdf.)
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notices for tax years 2012 through 2015, with the total number of notices for
all tax years reaching twenty-three. R473, 604; SE12; SE13. Yet Rasmussen did
not file tax returns for the 2010 through 2015 tax years or pay any taxes for
those years beyond a minimal amount withheld from his paychecks from
2010 through 2013. R606–07; SE20; SE21. A Tax Commission investigator
determined that Rasmussen owed $11,641 in taxes from 2010 through 2015.
SE21.
B. Summary of Proceedings
The State charged Rasmussen with one count of failure to render a tax
return and one count of tax evasion for each tax year from 2010 to 2015,
totaling six counts of tax evasion (a second-degree felony) and six counts of
failure to render a tax return (a third-degree felony). R98–103. The State also
charged Rasmussen with one count of a pattern of unlawful activity (a
second-degree felony). R103–04.
At trial, Rasmussen’s defense was that he did not file tax returns or pay
taxes based on a good-faith understanding that he was not required to do so.
R418–21. Rasmussen asked the court to instruct the jury that “[a] person who
acts on a good faith misunderstanding as to the requirements of the law does
not act willfully even if his understanding of the law is wrong or
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unreasonable.” R188. Rasmussen argued that this instruction should apply
“to all of the tax statutes where willfulness is a requirement.” R514, 516.
The trial court ruled that the instruction “goes too far” “the way it’s
written.” R516. Although the court did not elaborate on its reasoning, the
context of the parties’ arguments and the court’s questions indicate that the
court was concerned that the jury would apply the unreasonable-belief
instruction to all counts, and not just the counts requiring a willful mental
state. R512–16.
Tax evasion requires an intentional or willful mental state. Utah Code
§76-8-1101(1)(d)(i). 3 The elements instructions for each count of tax evasion
included this mental state. R240, 242, 244, 246, 248, 250. The mental state for
failure to file a tax return changed in 2014. Before 2014, failure to file required
an intent to evade. Utah Code §76-8-1101(1)(c)(i) (superseded 5/13/2014).
Beginning in 2014, a person could be guilty of failing to file only if he acted
“knowingly and intentionally, and without a reasonable good faith basis.”
Utah Code §76-8-1101(1)(c)(i). The elements instructions for failure to file for

The State cites to the code published on the Utah Legislature’s
website, and unless otherwise noted, any citation is to the current version of
the code.
3

–9–

tax years 2014 and 2015 thus included an explicit requirement that any goodfaith belief be reasonable. R249, 251.
Rasmussen conceded that his proposed instruction would not apply to
the last two counts of failure to file. R513. The court asked Rasmussen how
he could reword the proposed good-faith instruction to make that clear, and
Rasmussen responded that the instruction’s reference to willfulness sufficed
to limit its application to the tax-evasion counts. R513–14. The court
disagreed, but it said it “might reconsider” if Rasmussen wanted to “try a
redraft.” R516. Rasmussen never proposed a revised instruction to account
for the court’s concern.
Additional instructions addressed a good-faith defense. The jury was
instructed that “intent to evade” requires proof of “a conscious desire to
avoid a legal requirement with which the actor knows he or she is obligated
to comply.” R253. The jury was further instructed specific to the pre-2014
failure-to-file counts that “[a]n intent not to file a tax return, even if required
by law to file, is an ‘intent to evade’ only if the actor is aware that he or she is
legally required to file.” R261. Finally, the jury was instructed consistent with
the general mistake-of-law statute: Ignorance or mistake about “the existence
or meaning” of the law is no defense unless “the actor reasonably believed his
conduct did not constitute an offense” and the belief was based on reasonable
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reliance on (1) an official statement by an agency charged with enforcing the
law in question or (2) a written interpretation by a court or public servant
charged with interpreting the law in question. R265 (emphasis added). In
closing, Rasmussen argued that he acted under a reasonable, good-faith belief
that he was not required to pay taxes or file a return. R648, 651–54.
The court dismissed the pattern-of-unlawful-activity charge for
insufficient evidence. R569. The jury convicted Rasmussen of four counts—
one count of tax evasion for 2015 and three counts of failure to render tax
returns for 2013 through 2015—and acquitted him of the remaining counts.
R247–51, 279–80. The court sentenced Rasmussen to concurrent terms of zero
to five years on the three counts of failure to file and one to 15 years on the
single count of tax evasion. R292–93. The court ordered Rasmussen to pay the
back taxes, penalties, and interest as restitution. R293, 313–14. Rasmussen
timely appealed. R295.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rasmussen claims that the trial court should have given his good-faith
defense instruction. He contends that a key element of a good-faith defense
for tax evasion and failure to file a tax return is that a good-faith
misunderstanding of the law need not be reasonable. He also contends that
he was entitled to a separate instruction on this good-faith defense—that the
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instructions on mental state were insufficient to adequately present the
defense to the jury.
This Court should not reach Rasmussen’s claim that he was entitled to
the instruction he requested because he has not challenged the basis of the
trial court’s ruling. The court did not directly reach the question of whether
reasonableness was required for tax evasion and pre-2014 charges of failure
to file a tax return. Rather, the court ruled that because the failure-to-file
statute changed in 2014 to explicitly require that any good-faith
misunderstanding of the law be reasonable, Rasmussen’s requested
instruction went too far. Rasmussen has not grappled with that ruling, and
he has therefore forfeited any right to review of the trial court’s actual ruling.
In any event, this Court need not decide whether Rasmussen was
entitled to the instruction he sought because any error was harmless. First, as
to the two convictions of failure to file a tax return for 2014 and 2015, the
statute explicitly required a reasonable good-faith basis. Thus, any
instruction on an unreasonable good-faith basis would not have applied to
these counts, and denial of the instruction at most could have affected the
2013 conviction for failure to file a tax return and the 2015 conviction for tax
evasion.
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But there is no prejudice even as to those two convictions. Rasmussen
explained his understanding of the law to the Tax Commission, and it was
rejected. The jury acquitted Rasmussen of every count that related to his
actions before Rasmussen received notice that he owed taxes and that his
understanding of the law was wrong. But it convicted him of offenses starting
with the 2013 tax year. And by the time Rasmussen had to file his 2013 taxes—
April 2014—he was already on notice that his interpretation of the tax code
was wrong. Even if the jury had been instructed that Rasmussen’s belief did
not have to be reasonable, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury
would have found that he held that belief in good faith by 2014.
Rasmussen’s claim also fails on the merits. Although the law in Utah is
unclear on whether an unreasonable misunderstanding of the law can negate
a mental state—and Rasmussen has not carried his burden to show that this
unsettled point should be resolved in his favor—the law is clear on one point:
instructing the jury on the mental state required for an offense is adequate to
convey a good-faith defense, and any separate instruction on good-faith is
superfluous.
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ARGUMENT
Rasmussen does not challenge the basis of the trial
court’s ruling; in any event, he was not prejudiced
when the trial court declined to give an instruction
stating that his good-faith belief need not be
reasonable, nor was he entitled to the instruction.
Rasmussen challenges the trial court’s refusal to give his requested
good-faith defense instruction. He argues that a good-faith belief that he was
not required to pay or file taxes is a complete defense to both tax evasion and
failure to file a tax return, even if his belief was unreasonable. Br.Aplt.9–14.
He also argues that a separate good-faith belief instruction was required to
adequately instruct the jury. Br.Aplt.15–18. Finally, Rasmussen argues that
he was prejudiced by the exclusion of his proposed instruction. Br.Aplt.18–
19.
This Court should not address Rasmussen’s claim because he has not
challenged the basis of the trial court’s ruling. In any event, Rasmussen has
failed to establish either prejudice or error in the denial of the instruction.
Rasmussen could not have continued to hold a good-faith belief that he owed
no taxes after he was authoritatively told that his interpretation of the tax law
was wrong. And as a matter of law, the mental-state instruction sufficiently
apprised the jury of the good-faith defense.
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A. This Court should disregard Rasmussen’s claim because he
does not challenge the basis of the trial court’s decision.
As a threshold matter, this Court should decline to consider
Rasmussen’s claim because he has not carried his burden of persuasion on
appeal. “[O]ne of the most fundamental principles of the appellate process”
is that an appellant must “identify … flaws in the district court’s order.” Allen
v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶4, 194 P.3d 903. Thus, “[t]o carry his burden of
persuasion on appeal, an appellant must address ‘the actual basis for the
district court’s ruling.’” Gollaher v. State, 2017 UT App 168, ¶13, 405 P.3d 831.
An appellant “cannot make the same arguments anew while ignoring the
proceedings below that adjudicated the same issues.” State v. Newton, 2018
UT App 194, ¶20, --- P.3d ----. If an appellant does not challenge the actual
basis of the trial court’s ruling, “that decision will be placed beyond the reach
of further review.” Allen, 2008 UT 56, ¶7; see also id. ¶¶4, 7, 14, 15 (refusing to
consider claim when appellant “failed to address any of the district court’s
holdings”); State v. Needham, 2016 UT App 235, ¶2, 391 P.3d 295 (same).
When Rasmussen asked the trial court for an instruction that a goodfaith belief need not be reasonable, the court rejected the instruction because
it went “too far” given the legislature’s inclusion of a reasonableness
requirement in 2014 for failure to file a tax return. R512–16. The court invited
Rasmussen to submit a revised instruction to address this concern, but he did
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not do so. R516. The court appears to have been concerned that even with the
proposed instruction’s reference to willfulness, the jury may have been
confused as to when a good-faith belief needs to be reasonable and when it
does not. That concern is valid. Two counts referred explicitly to a
reasonableness requirement, and the statutory mistake-of-law instruction—
to which Rasmussen did not object—also included a reasonableness
requirement. R249, 251, 265, 516–17. Including another instruction stating
that a mistake of law need not be reasonable, without clarifying which counts
it applied to or how it related to the statutory mistake-of-law instruction,
would have confused the jury. See State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶31, 236
P.3d 161 (equating good-faith defense with mistake-of-law defense);
Br.Aplt.14 (same).
Because Rasmussen has not addressed what actually happened at trial,
and has not shown why the trial court’s actual ruling was erroneous, this
Court should reject his claim without further consideration.
B. Even if Rasmussen was entitled to an instruction that a goodfaith belief need not be reasonable, its exclusion was not
prejudicial because Rasmussen was repeatedly informed that
his belief was incorrect.
Appellate Courts “do not upset the verdict of a jury merely because
some error or irregularity may have occurred.” State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326,
1329 (Utah 1980). Only if a defendant demonstrates with reasonable
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likelihood that a “substantial and prejudicial” error affected the outcome of
his trial will a reviewing court reverse. Id. In the context of alleged error in
failing to instruct the jury on a defense, that analysis considers whether there
is a “‘reasonable likelihood’ that the outcome of trial would have been any
different” had the instruction been given. State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ¶43, 349
P.3d 712.
There is no reasonable likelihood of a better result for Rasmussen had
the jury received a separate instruction stating that his legal interpretation
need not be reasonable.
First, any instruction would necessarily exclude the two charges for
failure to file a tax return for 2014 and 2015. The statute explicitly required
proof that Rasmussen act “without a reasonable good faith basis.” Utah
Code §76-8-1101(1)(c)(i). Even if Rasmussen were entitled to an instruction
on an unreasonable good-faith defense, that instruction would have been
limited to the tax-evasion charges and perhaps the pre-2014 failure-to-file
charges. And Rasmussen was acquitted of all but two of those counts. Thus,
denial of the instruction at most could have affected the 2013 conviction for
failure to file a tax return and the 2015 conviction for tax evasion.
But even as to those two convictions, any error was harmless.
Rasmussen relies on Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), to establish
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that his good-faith defense need not be reasonable. But Cheek recognized
that notices like those Rasmussen received from the Tax Commission may
lead a jury to reject a defendant’s claim that his interpretation of the law
was held in good faith. Id. at 202. In Cheek, for example, the defendant
allegedly believed, like Rasmussen, that wages are not income. Id. at 195.
The Court held that the defendant’s belief need not be reasonable to avail
himself of the good-faith defense. Id. at 202–03. But the Court noted that the
jury’s assessment of whether the defendant “truly believed” he did not have
to pay taxes or file a tax return would turn on evidence showing the
defendant’s awareness of “the relevant provisions of the Code or
regulations, … court decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax law, …
authoritative rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, or … any contents of
the personal income tax return forms and accompanying instructions that
made it plain that wages should be returned as income.” Id. at 202. The
Court also acknowledged that “the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs
or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be
nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties.” Id. at
203–04. And disagreement with the law is not a defense. Id. at 205–06.
By Rasmussen’s own account, he based his interpretation in part on
IRS publications. But one of the exhibits the jury received included an IRS
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publication that plainly included wages in the definition of earned income.
SE21. And the Tax Commission told Rasmussen that his contrary
interpretation was wrong. Yet he continued to not pay taxes. Given the
evidence against him, there is no reasonable likelihood that a jury would have
found that Rasmussen acted in good faith, even if it had been instructed that
the belief need not be reasonable.
The State presented substantial evidence that Rasmussen knew he was
violating the law—in other words, that Rasmussen did not hold his belief in
good faith. Cf. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ¶40 (concluding that error was harmless
because of “overwhelming evidence” against defendant). In 2013 the Tax
Commission sent Rasmussen two separate Requests for Filing Information.
R453; SE4; SE8. Rasmussen explained his theory to the Tax Commission,
SE14, and in response the Tax Commission sent Rasmussen two separate
Notices of Deficiency and Estimated Income Tax. SE5; SE9. All of these
notices occurred before April 2014, when Rasmussen was required to file his
2013 taxes. R247, 279–80. Yet Rasmussen did not choose to pay his taxes
under protest and contest the validity of the Tax Commission’s interpretation
in court. Cf. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205–06 (discussing avenues available for
someone to challenge the legitimacy of the tax code). Instead, he chose not to
file his taxes.
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And by April 2016—the time of Rasmussen’s first and only conviction
for tax evasion—Rasmussen had more fully explained his theory to the Tax
Commission through the administrative appeals process, SE16, the Tax
Commission rejected his interpretation and upheld the assessment, SE17, and
the Tax Commission sent him additional notices for other tax years, with the
total number of notices reaching twenty-three. R473. Despite all of this,
Rasmussen maintained that he had a good-faith belief that he was not
violating the law. But there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would
have agreed if only it had been told that Rasmussen’s good-faith belief could
be unreasonable. Reasonable or not, Rasmussen knew his interpretation was
wrong by the time he did not file his 2013 taxes, and certainly by the time he
evaded his 2015 taxes.
Even if omitting a separate jury instruction on good faith was error, it
could not have affected two of his convictions. And for the remaining two
convictions for which the instruction would have been relevant, it is not
reasonably likely that the jury would have believed Rasmussen’s good-faith
defense.
C. Rasmussen was not entitled to a separate good-faith defense
instruction.
Rasmussen argues that because tax evasion and failure to file a tax
return require a mental state of specific intent to violate the law, even an
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unreasonable but good-faith belief that he was not required to pay taxes
would be a complete defense. Br.Aplt.9–15. Rasmussen further argues that
instructing the jury on the requisite mental state was insufficient to
adequately convey a good-faith defense; rather, a separate good-faith
instruction was necessary. Br.Aplt.15–19.
Rasmussen has not established that an unreasonable mistake of law is
a defense under Utah law. But even if it were, Utah law is clear that
defendants are not entitled to separate good-faith instructions when the
defense is aimed at negating an element of the offense.
The general rule in criminal cases is that “‘ignorance or mistake of law
provides no defense or excuse for a crime … [, and] a good faith or mistaken
belief that one’s conduct is legal does not relieve a person of criminal liability
for engaging in proscribed conduct.’” Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶30 (quoting
what is now 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §132 (2019 update)); accord Cheek,
498 U.S. at 199.
There are two common exceptions to this rule. One is a “narrow
exception” that excuses otherwise criminal conduct when the defendant acts
with a mistaken belief that he is not violating the law and “the mistake arises
from a reasonable reliance on an official written statement of the law.” Steele,
2010 UT App 185, ¶30. The other negates the mental state for a specific-intent
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crime—or a crime that requires awareness of or intent to violate the law—
when the defendant mistakenly believes in good faith that his actions do not
violate the law. Id. ¶31; Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199–202; 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §5.6(a) (3d ed. Oct. 2018 update). Unlike with the
excuse-based exception, some courts have held that under the mental-state
exception the defendant’s misunderstanding of the law need not be
reasonable. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202–03.
Utah clearly adopted the first, excuse-based exception when it enacted
the mistake-of-law statute. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶30; see Utah Code §762-304(2) (stating that ignorance or mistake of law is a defense only when
defendant’s belief that his conduct did not constitute an offense is reasonable
and is based on an official written statement either from a court,
administrative agency, or public servant charged with interpreting the law in
question).
But this Court has stated that it is an open question whether Utah’s
mistake-of-law statute was intended to “define the exclusive exception to the
general prohibition on the mistake of law defense or whether there remains
room for a specific intent exception.” Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶32. The Court
also stated that even in jurisdictions that recognize a mental-state exception,
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courts have not uniformly allowed unreasonable mistakes to negate a
required mental state. Id. ¶31.
The mistake-of-law statute speaks in absolute terms, stating that
“[i]gnorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law
is no defense to a crime unless” the specific conditions of the statute are
satisfied. Utah Code §76-2-304(2) (emphases added); see also Utah Code §761-103(1) (“The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the
punishment for, and defenses against any offense defined in this code … .”);
Utah Code §76-2-304(1) (treating negation of mental state as affirmative
defense for purposes of mistake-of-fact defense). On its face, the mistake-oflaw statute appears to allow for the mental-state exception only as long as the
defendant’s misunderstanding was reasonable and was based on a written
official interpretation of the law. 4

In State v. Granato, 610 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1980), the supreme court
overturned a conviction where the defendant had no knowledge that he was
violating a campaign contribution law. Id. at 1291–92. A dissenting opinion
suggested that the conditions of the mistake-of-law statute had not been
satisfied. Id. at 1293 (Christoffersen, J., dissenting). The majority ruled that the
evidence of intent was insufficient, but it merely acknowledged the mistakeof-law statute without analyzing it. Id. at 1292 (majority opinion). While the
result of Granato is consistent with recognizing a separate mental-state
exception that coexists with the mistake-of-law statute, the court’s silence on
the issue supports this Court’s subsequent conclusion that it is an open
question.
4
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Although some Utah cases have spoken generically of a good-faith
defense, they have been inconsistent on when it applies, they have been silent
on whether an unreasonable mistake would suffice, and they have been silent
on whether the mistake-of-law statute was intended to be the exclusive
exception to the general rule. 5
Rasmussen has not addressed the plain language of the mistake-of-law
statute, let alone explained why that statute does not occupy the field when
it comes to mistake-of-law defenses. And while he refers to State v. Steele—
the case in which this Court acknowledged that the issue was unsettled—he
quotes only the portion of the opinion that says the mental-state exception
“‘arguably’” applies in Utah. Br.Aplt.14 (quoting Steele, 2010 UT App 185,
¶32). Rasmussen’s failure to engage the issue this Court has identified

See State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ¶19, 179 P.3d 792 (implicitly recognizing
good-faith defense for tax evasion, which requires an intentional or willful
mental state); State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357, 1360 & n.8 (Utah 1993)
(concluding that good-faith defense was unavailable because securities fraud
statute required willful mental state but not specific intent); State v. Stringham,
2001 UT App 13, ¶¶20–21, 17 P.3d 1153 (recognizing good-faith defense in
communications fraud case requiring reckless mental state); see also Bryan v.
United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–96 (1998) (distinguishing Cheek and
concluding that firearms statute requiring showing of willful violation of law
“does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the
law is no excuse”). Cf. Benjamin v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2011 UT 14, ¶32,
250 P.3d 39 (recognizing reasonable, good-faith defense to civil tax penalty
imposed for negligence).
5
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amounts to a failure to carry his burden to show that he is entitled to an
instruction stating that an unreasonable mistake of law negates a willful
mental state. This Court should reject Rasmussen’s claim without deciding
whether he was entitled to the instruction. See State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65,
¶21, 147 P.3d 448 (“It falls squarely upon an appellant to surmount the filing,
briefing, and persuasion burdens associated with an appeal. … An appellate
court that does the lifting for an appellant distorts this fundamental allocation
of benefits and burdens.”).
But even if a mental-state exception survives the mistake-of-law
statute, and even if an unreasonable misunderstanding of the law can negate
the mental states at issue in this case, Rasmussen was not entitled to a
separate good-faith instruction to that effect. This Court has squarely held
that instructions on the required mental state are adequate to convey a goodfaith defense. In State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, 17 P.3d 1153, the Court
explained that “‘a jury finding that the defendant has acted knowingly and
willfully is inconsistent with a finding that the defendant acted in good
faith.’” Id. ¶¶20–21. The Court thus held that a separate good-faith instruction
is “‘merely surplusage,’” “a redundant version’” of the instructions on the
required mental state. Id. ¶20. This Court later applied that holding to the
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very statutes at issue here—tax evasion and failure to file a tax return. State
v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, ¶¶21–23, 72 P.3d 692.
The primary case Rasmussen relies on—State v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716
(10th Cir. 1984) (en banc)—has been overruled on this very point because
every federal circuit “has come to reject the idea that district courts must give
a separate ‘good faith’ jury instruction in fraud cases.” United States v.
Bowling, No. 08–6184, 2009 WL 6854970, at *1 n.* (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2009) (en
banc). Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has rejected this argument
in the context of tax law. In the very case Rasmussen relies on to establish that
a good-faith mistake of law need not be reasonable, the Supreme Court
reiterated that “after instructing the jury on willfulness, ‘[a]n additional
instruction on good faith [is] unnecessary.” Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201 (first
alteration in original).
The law in Utah and elsewhere is clear: A separate good-faith
instruction is unnecessary. The jury was instructed that to convict Rasmussen
of tax evasion, it had to find that he intentionally or willfully attempted to
evade or defeat a tax that he owed. R240, 256. The jury was told that a person
acts intentionally or willfully “when it is his or her conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” R252. It was instructed
that evade means “avoidance of something by effort, skill, dexterity,
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contrivance, subterfuge, ingenuity, or artifice,” and that “intent to evade”
requires proof of “a conscious desire to avoid a legal requirement with which
the actor knows he or she is obligated to comply.” R253.
On the pre-2014 failure-to-file counts, the jury was instructed that it
had to find that Rasmussen acted with intent to evade or with a “conscious
desire to evade.” R241, 261. It was further instructed that “[a]n intent not to
file a tax return, even if required by law to file, is an ‘intent to evade’ only if
the actor is aware that he or she is legally required to file.” R261. And for the
2014 and 2015 failure-to-file counts, the elements instructions stated that the
jury could only convict Rasmussen if it found that he acted knowingly and
intentionally and “without a reasonable good faith basis.” R249, 251; see also
R262 (defining “intentionally” and “knowingly”).
Nothing in the instructions precluded Rasmussen from arguing on the
tax evasion and pre-2014 failure-to-file charges that his understanding of the
law need not have been reasonable. Rather, the instructions adequately
conveyed to the jury that if Rasmussen in good faith believed, even
unreasonably as to the pre-2014 counts, that he did not owe taxes and was
not required to file a tax return, he did not act willfully, intentionally, or
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knowingly. Taken as a whole, these instructions “‘fairly instruct the jury on
the law applicable to the case.’” Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶148. 6

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State asks this Court to affirm
Rasmussen’s convictions.
Respectfully submitted on April 1, 2019.
SEAN D. REYES
Utah Attorney General
/s/ William M. Hains
WILLIAM M. HAINS
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Appellee

In his prejudice argument, Rasmussen makes several unpreserved
challenges to the accuracy of the mental state in the elements instructions on
the 2014 and 2015 failure-to-file charges, which largely track the statutory
language. Br.Aplt.18–19; see also R249, 251; Utah Code §76-8-1101(1)(c).
Rasmussen invited any error in these instructions when he told the trial court
that he had no further objections to the jury instructions beyond the one
instruction that was rejected. R516–17; State v. Crespo, 2017 UT App 219, ¶22
n.5, 409 P.3d 99 (“Because defense counsel stated that he did not have any
objections to the jury instructions at trial, the invited error doctrine precludes
us from reviewing this claim under plain error.”).
6
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Addendum A
Statutes

Utah Code

76-2-304 Ignorance or mistake of fact or law.
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental
state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a
crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute
an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an
administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question;
or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of record or made by a
public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a defense to the offense
charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser included offense of which he would be
guilty if the fact or law were as he believed.
Amended by Chapter 32, 1974 General Session
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Utah Code

Effective 5/13/2014
76-8-1101 Criminal offenses and penalties relating to revenue and taxation -- Rulemaking
authority -- Statute of limitations.
(1)
(a) As provided in Section 59-1-401, criminal offenses and penalties are as provided in
Subsections (1 )(b) through (e).
{b)
(i) Any person who is required by Title 59, Revenue and Taxation, or any laws the State Tax
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or permit from the
State Tax Commission, who operates without having registered or secured a license or
permit, or who operates when the registration, license, or permit is expired or not current, is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1 )(b)(i), the penalty may not:
(A) be less than $500; or
{B) exceed $1,000.
(c)
(i) With respect to a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401, any person who
knowingly and intentionally, and without a reasonable good faith basis, fails to make, render,
sign, or verify any return within the time required by law or to supply any information within
the time required by law, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent
return or statement, or who supplies any false or fraudulent information, is guilty of a third
degree felony.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1 )(c)(i), the penalty may not:
(A) be less than $1,000; or
(B) exceed $5,000.
(d)
(i) Any person who intentionally or willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax, fee, or charge
as defined in Section 59-1-401 or the payment of a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section
59-1-401 is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty of a second degree felony.
{ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1 )(d)(i), the penalty may not:
(A) be less than $1,500; or
(B) exceed $25,000.
(e)
(i) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if that person commits an act:
(A) described in Subsection (1 )(e)(ii) with respect to one or more of the following documents:
(I) a return;
(II) an affidavit;
{Ill) a claim; or
(IV) a document similar to Subsections (1 )(e)(i)(A)(I) through (Ill); and
(B) subject to Subsection (1 )(e)(iii), with knowledge that the document described in
Subsection ( 1)( e )(i)(A):
( I) is false or fraudulent as to any material matter; and
(II) could be used in connection with any material matter administered by the State Tax
Commission.
(ii) The following acts apply to Subsection (1 )(e)(i):
(A) preparing any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A);
(B) presenting any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A);
(C) procuring any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A);
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(D) advising in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in
Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A);
(E) aiding in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in
Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A);
(F) assisting in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in
Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); or
(G) counseling in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in
Subsection ( 1)( e )(i)(A).
(iii) This Subsection (1 )(e) applies:
(A) regardless of whether the person for which the document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)
(A) is prepared or presented:
(I) knew of the falsity of the document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); or
(11) consented to the falsity of the document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); and
(B) in addition to any other penalty provided by law.
(iv) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of this Subsection (1 )(e), the penalty may
not:
(A) be less than $1,500; or
(B) exceed $25,000.
(v) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the State Tax
Commission may make rules prescribing the documents that are similar to Subsections (1)
(e)(i)(A)(I) through (Ill).
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is the later of six years:
(a) from the date the tax should have been remitted; or
(b) after the day on which the person commits the criminal offense.
Amended by Chapter 52, 2014 General Session
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Superseded 5/13/2014
76-8-1101 Criminal offenses and penalties relating to revenue and taxation -- Rulemaking
authority -- Statute of limitations.
(1)
(a) As provided in Section 59-1-401, criminal offenses and penalties are as provided in
Subsections (1 )(b) through (e).
(b)
(i) Any person who is required by Title 59, Revenue and Taxation, or any laws the State Tax
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or permit from the
State Tax Commission, who operates without having registered or secured a license or
permit, or who operates when the registration, license, or permit is expired or not current, is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1 )(b)(i), the penalty may not:
(A) be less than $500; or
(B) exceed $1,000.
(c)
(i) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401
or requirement of Title 59, Revenue and Taxation, or any lawful requirement of the
State Tax Commission, fails to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any
information within the time required by law, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any
false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or fraudulent information,
is guilty of a third degree felony.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1 )(c)(i), the penalty may not:
(A) be less than $1,000; or
(B) exceed $5,000.
(d)
(i) Any person who intentionally or willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax, fee, or charge
as defined in Section 59-1-401 or the payment of a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section
59-1-401 is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty of a second degree felony.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection ( 1)( d)(i), the penalty may not:
(A) be less than $1,500; or
(B) exceed $25,000.
(e)
(i) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if that person commits an act:
(A) described in Subsection (1 )(e)(ii) with respect to one or more of the following documents:
(I) a return;
(II) an affidavit;
(Ill) a claim; or
(IV) a document similar to Subsections (1 )(e)(i)(A)(I) through (Ill); and
(B) subject to Subsection (1 )(e)(iii), with knowledge that the document described in
Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A):
(I) is false or fraudulent as to any material matter; and
(II) could be used in connection with any material matter administered by the State Tax
Commission.
(ii) The following acts apply to Subsection (1 )(e)(i):
(A) preparing any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A);
(B) presenting any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A);
(C) procuring any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A);
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(D) advising in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in
Subsection ( 1 )( e )(i)(A);
(E) aiding in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in
Subsection ( 1 )( e )(i)(A);
(F) assisting in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in
Subsection ( 1 )( e )(i)(A); or
(G) counseling in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in
Subsection ( 1 )( e )(i)(A).
(iii) This Subsection (1 )(e) applies:
(A) regardless of whether the person for which the document described in Subsection ( 1)( e )(i)
(A) is prepared or presented:
(I) knew of the falsity of the document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); or
(II) consented to the falsity of the document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); and
(B) in addition to any other penalty provided by law.
(iv) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of this Subsection (1 )(e), the penalty may
not:
{A) be less than $1,500; or
(B) exceed $25,000.
(v) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the State Tax
Commission may make rules prescribing the documents that are similar to Subsections ( 1)
(e)(i)(A)(I) through (111).
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is the later of six years:
(a) from the date the tax should have been remitted; or
(b) after the day on which the person commits the criminal offense.
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Addendum B
Argument & Ruling on
Requested Good-faith Defense Instruction
(R512-17)

1

MR. PALUMBO:

It says, "The government must prove

2

beyond a reasonable doubt that ~.r. Rasmussen knew that the law

3

imposed a duty on him and Mr. Rasmussen intentionally and

4

voluntarily violated that duty."
This is a defense request?

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. PALUMBO:

It is, Your Honor.

7

MR.

It is.

8

THE COURT:

9

HANSEEN:

Okay.

"The government must prove," and

what's your argument there?

10

MR. PALUMBO:

Well, my argument is that it says that

11

Mr. Rasmussen intentionally and voluntarily violated that duty.

12

Those are not the mental states that the State is required to

13

prove.

14

So that's one concern.
The other concern is in the second paragraph.

It

15

says, "A person who acts on a good faith misunderstanding as to

16

requirements of the law does not act willfully even if his

17

understanding of the law is wrong or unreasonable."

18

In the amended failure to file count -- the good

19

faith belief actually has to be reasonable in order to be a

20

defense to the mental state.

21

unreasonable for those two counts is legally wrong.

22

my objection to that.

23
24
25

So saying that it could be
So that's

And then I also do not believe that that would apply
to the other counts that are charged.
THE COURT:

Defense?

195

00512

1

MR. RICKEY:

Judge, in so far -- I mean, this

2

instruction comes from the Cheek decision in so far as far as

3

the two new statutes specifically say that a good faith belief

4

must be reasonable.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. RICKEY:

On that the -- which statute?
The two -- the evasion statutes for I

7

believe it's 2015 and '16, failure to render -- sorry, not the

8

evasion, the failure to render.

9

the -- since those specifically say that the good faith belief

Yeah, I would agree that

10

needs to be reasonable, that that language -- the

11

unreasonableness language shouldn't apply.

12
13

THE COURT:

So how would you reword it to meet the

objection of the State?

14

MR. PALUMBO:

15

MR. RICKEY:

Your Honor, in fact -I understand willfully, Judge, to answer

16

your question, I think the sentence should say the law -- a

17

person who acts on a good faith misunderstanding as to

18

requirements of the law, and we can even make relative to the

19

failure to render counts does not act willfully in that

20

sentence there.

21

THE COURT:

So honest mistake is not acting

22

willfully?

23

what you would -- how you get around the problem here.

24
25

Is that where you're going?

MR. RICKEY:

I don't know exactly

Right, Judge, I think that -- I mean,

it's provided for in the 2015/2016 files --
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. RICKEY:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HANSEEN:

Counts.
10 and 12.
10 and 12.
That a good faith reasonable belief

5

applies.

6

believe it applies to all of the tax statutes where willfulness

7

is a requirement.

8

can have the good faith belief as a defense to not

9

understanding the duty imposed by the tax law.

10

I think that also given, given the ruling in Cheek, I

That's the argument we're making.

THE COURT:

That one

Well, so you're saying if your client had

11

an opinion that the law did not impose a duty on him, that he

12

can't be found to intentionally violate that duty, huh?
MR. HANSEEN:

13

Not necessarily.

And, Your Honor, I

14

think the case law suggests good faith belief relative to the

15

federal

16
17

THE COURT:
belief in this --

18

MR. HANSEEN:

19

THE COURT:

20
21

Let's see, have we defined good faith

No.
Is there a definition of good faith

belief anywhere?
MR. PALUMBO:

The reference that defense counsel

22

included with the proposed jury instruction was to Cheek versus

23

United States, which is Utah -- or I'm sorry, a Supreme Court

24

of the United States case, and it was an interpretation of the

25

IRS's criminal statute which is distinct from the Utah statute.
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1

They are similar, but the mental state that was at issue in the

2

IRS statute is willfulness.

3

state for one charge in this case, the evasion statute.

4

again, I think just quoting to the holding of Cheek is improper

5

in this case because our mental states are completely

6

different.

7

That is a component of mental
But

And so I'm not sure if that actually solves the

8

problem.

Furthermore, the legislature introduced a good faith

9

exception to the mental state in 2014.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. PALUMBO:

Right.
They know how to do that.

They did not

12

include it for evasion.

13

think that shows the legislative intent not to have good faith

14

defense or exception to the evasion or failure to file a

15

statute prior to 2014.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. PALUMBO:

18

They did not include before 2014.

I

How about after 2014?
After 2014 for the failure to file,

there is absolutely in the statute a good faith defense.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. PALUMBO:

Well, yes.
The good faith has to be reasonable.

21

The belief has to be reasonable or else it's not a defense.

22

unreasonable defense does not work post 2014 failure to file.

23

MR. RICKEY:

24

THE COURT:

25

An

And, Judge, just to address that
So your opposition is to the -- if his

understanding is unreasonable that they are arguing here should
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1

apply, you are saying no way.

2

MR. PALUMBO:

3

MR. JONES:

4

MR. RICKEY:

Correct.
Correct, it's not the law.
And, Your Honor, just if I may briefly.

5

We also referenced in this -- one of the other citation was the

6

Eyre case.

7

it involves the federal tax statute.

8

statutes are similar to one another, Utah will look at the

9

federal statute as well as the reasoning and the case law

I understand the concern, the Cheek is a federal -Eyre does say that when

10

behind how the federal statute has been applied and that's why

11

I think the way -- the way the United States Supreme Court

12

addressed willfulness relative to the federal tax statutes, I

13

think it should -- it can equally apply to Utah statutes when

14

willfulness is a mental state requirement.

15

THE COURT:

Well, I'm -- I'm going to not allow this

16

instruction the way it's written to come in.

17

try a redraft and maybe a real informal brief on it, I might

18

reconsider that before we actually give it, but I -- I don't

19

think this instruction would be proper.

20

What I did this morning is

If you wish to

It goes too far.
when I saw you had

21

filed these proposed instructions, I just asked her to put them

22

in and we would discuss them and that's what I am doing here.

23

Anything else?

24

MR. PALUMBO:

25

THE COURT:

Not from the State, Your Honor.
Defense?
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1

MR. HANSEEN:

2

THE COURT:

3

agreement on the instructions?

No, Your Honor.

We'll --

So other than this instruction, we're in

4

MR. HANSEEN:

5

THE COURT:

Yes, I believe so.
So we pull out your No. 27 and what was

6

this one you numbered?

7

MR. HANSEEN:

8

THE COURT:

9

Now, do you have any concern about this ordering that

35.
35.

10

I've done?

It's a little unique, I acknowledge, but I've

11

tried, like I said, to make it clear.

12

in the RICO with everything else, frankly.

13

what -- or have them look at the elements of that.

14

know how they are going to do it in the jury room, but you

15

never know.

16

each other so they just don't get overwhelmed with all of this

17

legalese stuff we've got.

18

that keep popping up in different places that are a little

19

different are confusing frankly.

I did not want to throw
I wanted to see
I don't

But at least I wanted to separate them a bit from

20

Okay.

21

MR. PALUMBO:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. HANSEEN:

Willful, all of these definitions

We'll see you at 8:30 in the morning.

24

issue before we go.

25

we are.

Thanks, Judge.
Thank you.
Judge, maybe one more housekeeping

I guess procedurally, I don't know where

Has the State rested?

Is that where we are?
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SCOTT RASMUSSEN,
JUDGE SHAUGHNESSY
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The defendant, SCOTT RASMUSSEN, by and through counsel, SAMUEL J. HANSEEN
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RICKEY, hereby respectfully requests this court to include the attached jury

instructions.

Respectfully submitted this 28th day of August, 2017.

Isl Samuel J Hanseen
SAMUEL J. HANSEEN
Isl Mitchell Z. Rickey
MITCHELL Z. RICKEY
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00187

Jury Instruction __
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Rasmussen
knew that the law imposed a duty on him, and Mr. Rasmussen intentionally and
voluntarily violated that duty.
A person who acts on a good faith misunderstanding as to the requirements
of the law does not act willfully even if his understanding of the law is wrong or
unreasonable. Nevertheless, merely disagreeing with the law does not constitute a
good faith misunderstanding of the law. To find Mr. Rasmussen guilty, the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have
a good faith belief that he was complying with the law.

Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991); State v. EyTe, 2008 UT 16, ,i 13;
179 P.3d 72, 796.

00188

Jury Instruction __
To prove that Mr. Rasmussen intentionally or willfully attempted to evade
any tax, fee, or charge previously defined, the State must first prove the existence of
a tax deficiency. If the State has not proved the existence of such a deficiency, you
must find Mr. Rasmussen not guilty.

State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16

,r

14·15; 179 P.3d 792, 796-797.

00189

Jury Instruction __
"Evade" is defined as avoidance of something by effort, skill, dexterity,
contrivance, subterfuge, ingenuity, or artifice. In order to prove that Mr. Rasmussen
had an intent to evade, the State must prove a conscious desire to avoid a legal
requirement with which the actor knows he or she is obligated to comply.
An intent not to file a tax return, even if required by law to file, is an "intent
to evade" only if the actor is aware that he or she is legally required to file.

Silver v. Auditing Div. of State Tax Com'n, 820 P.2d 912, 915 (1991)

00190

AddendumD
Jury Instructions 1-26
(R240-66)

INSTRUCTION NO. ---=--\

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 1 with committing Tax Evasion on or
about April 18, 2011. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted;
(3) To evade or defeat;
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; OR
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00240

INSTRUCTION NO.

1,_

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 2 with committing Failure to Render
Tax Returns on or about April 18, 2011. You cannot convict him of this offense unless

'

based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements:
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) With intent to evade any
a. Tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or
b. Requirement of Title 59, revenue and taxation; or
c. Any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission
(3) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information
within the time required by law; or
(4) Made, rendered, signed or verified any false or fraudulent return or statement;
or
(5) Supplied any false or fraudulent information.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUilTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00241

INSTRUCTION NO.

-3
--

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 3 with committing Tax Evasion on or
about April 17, 2012. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted;
(3) To evade or defeat;
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; OR
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUilTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00242

INSTRUCTION NO.

_Y__

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 4 with committing Failure to Render
Tax Returns on or about April 17, 2012. You cannot convict him of this offense unless,
based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements:

(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) With intent to evade any
a. tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or
b. requirement of Title 59, revenue and taxation; or
c. Any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission
(3) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information
within the time required by law; or

(4) Made, rendered, signed or verified any false or fraudulent return or statement;
or
(5) Supplied any false or fraudulent information.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUilTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00243

INSTRUCTION NO.

-5- -

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 5 with committing Tax Evasion on or
about April 15, 2013. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted;
(3) To evade or defeat;
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; OR
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00244

INSTRUCTION NO.

~--

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 6 with committing Failure to Render
Tax Returns on or about April 15, 2013. You cannot convict him of this offense unless,
based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements:
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) With intent to evade any

a. tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or
b. requirement of Title 59, revenue and taxation; or
c. Any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission
(3) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information

within the time required by law; or
(4) Made, rendered, signed or verified any false or fraudulent return or statement;
or
(5) Supplied any false or fraudulent information.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUilTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00245

INSTRUCTION NO.

7

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 7 with committing Tax Evasion on or
about April 15, 2014. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted;
(3) To evade or defeat;
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; OR
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00246

INSTRUCTION NO.

~

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 8 with committing Failure to Render
Tax Returns on or about April 15, 2014. You cannot convict him of this offense unless,
based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements:

(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) With intent to evade any
a. tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or
b. requirement of Title 59, revenue and taxation; or
c. Any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission
(3) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information
within the time required by law; or
(4) Made, rendered, signed or verified any false or fraudulent return or statement;
or
(5) Supplied any false or fraudulent information.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUilTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00247

9

INSTRUCTION NO. - - -

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 9 with committing Tax Evasion on or
about April 15, 2015. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted;
(3) To evade or defeat;
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUilTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00248

INSTRUCTION NO.

/

D

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 10 with committing Failure to Render
Tax Returns on or about April 15, 2015. You cannot convict him of this offense unless,
based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements:
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) With respect to a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401
(3) Knowingly and intentionally, without a reasonable good faith basis;
(4) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return;
(5) Within the time required by law; or
(6) Failed to supply information within the time required by law or
(7) Made, rendered, signed, or verified any false or fraudulent return or
statement; or
(8) Supplied any false or fraudulent information.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUilTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00249

INSTRUCTION NO.

Il

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 11 with committing Tax Evasion on or
about April 15, 2016. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
( 1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted;
(3) To evade or defeat;
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUilTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00250

l-Z

INSTRUCTION NO. - - -

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 12 with committing Failure to Render
Tax Returns on or about April 15, 2016. You cannot convict him of this offense unless,
based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements:
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen;
(2) With respect to a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401
(3) Knowingly and intentionally, without a reasonable good faith basis;
(4) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return;
(5) Within the time required by law; or
(6) Failed to supply information within the time required by law or
(7) Made, rendered, signed, or verified any false or fraudulent return or
statement; or
(8) Supplied any false or fraudulent information.
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant GUilTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
NOT GUILTY.

00251

3_

INSTRUCTION NO._)

Before you can convict the defendant of Tax Evasion, as charged in Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9,
and 11 of the Information, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
acted "intentionally" or "willfully." These are specifically defined terms that have the
following meanings under the laws of the State of Utah:
"Intentionally" or "willfully": a person engages in conduct intentionally, or with
intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his
conduct when it is his or her conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.

00252

INSTRUCTION NO.

_a

"Evade" is defined as avoidance of something by effort, skill, dexterity,
contrivance, subterfuge, ingenuity, or artifice. In order to prove that Mr. Rasmussen had
an intent to evade, the State must prove a conscious desire to avoid a legal requirement
with which the actor knows he or she is obligated to comply.

00253

INSTRUCTION NO.

{

5

Every resident individual is required to file a state tax return in any year they are
required to file a federal return. And a federal return must be filed whenever certain
income thresholds are met-a tax does not necessarily need to be owed. Accordingly,
Title 59 also requires residents to file income tax returns whenever these same income
thresholds are met. Utah tax returns must be filed on or before April 15 or on or before
the federal filing date.
The filing thresholds for the relevant years are as follows:
2010 - $9,350
2011 - $9,500
2012 - $9,750
2013 - $10,000
2014 - $10,150
2015 - 10,300

00254

INSTRUCTION NO.

"Resident individual" of the State of Utah means:
(A) an individual who is domiciled in this state (Utah) for any period of time
during the taxable year, but only for the duration of the period during which the
individual is domiciled in this state; or
(B) an individual who is not domiciled in this state but:
(I) maintains a permanent place of abode in this state; and
(II) spends in the aggregate 183 or more days of the taxable year in this
state.
(ii) For purposes of this Subsection (1 )(q)(i)(B), a fraction of a
calendar day shall be counted as a whole day.

00255

INSTRUCTION NO.

17

With respect to the offense of Tax Evasion, as charged in Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9
and 11 of the Information, the State must prove as an element of the offense that the
defendant owed state income tax for the period alleged.

00256

INSTRUCTION NO.

ls

"Taxable income" or "state taxable income" for a resident individual, means the resident
individual's adjusted gross income after making the additions, and subtractions, and
adjustments required by Title 59. However, if an individual fails to file tax returns,
unclaimed deductions are completely unavailable to him or her.

00257

INSTRUCTION NO.

l9

---'--

Unless a resident individual is exempt, a tax is imposed on the state taxable income of a
resident individual equal to 5% of the resident individual's state taxable income for that
taxable year.

00258

INSTRUCTION NO.

1.0

An individual is exempt from a tax imposed by Utah Code, Title 59, if the individual's
adjusted gross income on the individual's federal individual income tax return for the
taxable year is less than or equal to the sum of the individual's:
a. personal exemptions for the taxable year; and
b. standard deduction for that taxable year
"Personal exemptions" means the total exemption amount an individual is allowed to
claim for the taxable year under Section 151, Internal Revenue Code.
"Standard deduction" means the standard deduction an individual is allowed to claim for
the taxable year under Section 63, Internal Revenue Code.
Personal Exemptions for the relevant years were as follows:
2010 - $2,738
2011 - $2,775
2012 - $2,850
2013 - $2,925
2014 - $2,962.50
2015 - $3,000
Standard deductions for the relevant years were as follows:
2010 - $5,700
2011 - $5,800
2012 - $5,950
2013 - $6,100
2014 - $6,200
2015 - $6,300

00259

INSTRUCTION NO.

t-\

The defendant's state of mind with regard to the alleged conduct may be inferred
from the defendant's actions or from the surrounding circumstances. Reasonable
inferences regarding the defendant's intent, willfulness, knowledge, or recklessness, or
lack thereof, may be drawn from the surrounding facts.

00260

INSTRUCTION NO.

L 2-

With respect to Counts 2, 4, 6 and 8, Failure to Render Tax Returns, the State must
prove that it was the defendant's conscious desire to evade any
a. tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or
b. requirement of Title 59, revenue and taxation; or
c. any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission

An intent not to file a tax return, even if required by law to file, is an "intent to
evade" only if the actor is aware that he or she is legally required to file.

00261

INSTRUCTION NO.

~3

Before you can convict the defendant of Failure to Render a Tax Return, as charged in
Counts 10 and 12 of the Information, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant acted "knowingly" and "intentionally." These are specifically defined terms
that have the following meanings under the laws of the State of Utah:
(1) "Intentionally": a person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct
when it is his or her conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
(2) "Knowingly": a person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect to his or her conduct or to circumstances surrounding his or her
conduct when he or she is aware of the nature of his or her conduct or the
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect to a result of his or her conduct when he or she is aware that his or
her conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

00262

INSTRUCTION NO.

~~

If a person required to file a return with the Utah State Tax Commission fails to
file the return with the Commission, the Commission may estimate the tax, fee, or
charge due from the best information or knowledge the Commission can obtain.

00263

INSTRUCTION NO.

L-?

Gross income is all income from whatever sources.

00264

INSTRUCTION NO.

L (o

Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense
to a crime unless:
(a)

Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct

did not constitute an offense; and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or
grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law
with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a
court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question.

00265

INSTRUCTION NO.

L-/

A person acts "intentionally," "willfully," or "with intent" when his or her conscious
objective is to engage in certain conduct. Conduct means either an act or an omission.

00266

